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<h1>COMP3502 – Assignment Two – Privacy</h1>
<p>For which I initially achieved 74%, upgraded to 84% after a remark. </p>
<p><a href="#spec">Specification</a> | <a href="#subm">My Submission</a> </p>
<h2 id="spec">Specification</h2>
<p>Select some modern technology (eg. mobile phone, smart card bus tickets, swipe
cards, Fly Buys, web browsers) which may have some impact on personal privacy.</p>
<p> Discuss the influence of this technology on privacy.</p>
<p> Aspects you may want to consider include:</p>
<ul>
<li> How it might impact on privacy - what information might be collected, by
whom, made available to whom, and whether there may be problems with this.</li>
<li> Are users made aware of privacy implications.</li>
<li> What freedom of choice do users have, in terms of the political and economic
considerations.</li>
<li> Are there competitive market forces at play?</li>
<li> Are there technological approaches that do or could contribute to privacy?</li>
<li> Are there technical tradeoffs that mean the most private option may not
be the best?</li>
<li> Are there tradeoffs between privacy and other social benefits?</li>
<li> Do the national privacy principles apply?</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<h1 id="subm" style="text-align:center">Overt Video Surveillance, Facial Recognition, and its Impact
on Privacy </h1>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<blockquote>
<p><em>“The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any sound that
Winston made, above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up by
it; moreover, so long as he remained within the field of vision which the
metal plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. There was of course
no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. How
often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual
wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all
the time. But at any rate they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted
to. You had to live - did live, from habit that became instinct - in the assumption
that every sound you made was overheard, and except in darkness, every movement
scrutinised.” </em></p>
</blockquote>
<p style="text-align:right">• <em>George Orwell's 1984 </em></p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align:center">Ned Martin </p>
<p style="text-align:center"><br />
Monday, 11 October 2004 </p>
<p> </p>
<p>Today, a hidden, wireless camera can tirelessly observe, through the dark,
further and better than a human can. Systems that automatically recognize faces
and suspicious activity are being developed and deployed. What was once science
fiction is now reality, and people are being forced to face the new privacy
issues this raises. </p>
<p>Surveillance, which has until recently been limited by the sheer manpower
required, is now automated and rapidly making inroads into the most intimate
parts of our daily lives. In 2002 it was estimated that over 25 million public
surveillance cameras were in use worldwide[<a href="#_edn1" id="_ednref1">1</a>],
a figure expected to have climbed rapidly as the cost of video surveillance
further decreased, bringing an increase in the everyday use or surveillance
cameras, and an associated increase in the issues involved. Of these, 33 wide-scale
government video surveillance systems have been installed in Australia, along
with several more privately operated systems[<a href="#_edn2" id="_ednref2">2</a>]. </p>
<h2>Video Surveillance </h2>
<p>There are two main types of video surveillance – overt, where no attempt is
made to conceal the fact that a subject is under surveillance, and covert, where
the subject is prevented from knowing they are under surveillance. We examine
overt video surveillance, but we do make a distinction between surveillance
where a subject is unaware they are under surveillance, and surveillance where
a subject is actively prevented from knowing they are under surveillance, as
one of the issues facing overt surveillance arises when those being surveilled
are not explicitly told. In particular, we examine the privacy concerns raised
by overt video surveillance, chiefly as used today, and the various ways these
can or should be countered. We examine the various ways in which video surveillance
is used, and then consider likely directions this technology will take, the
impact this may have on privacy, and current efforts to regulate and control
this. </p>
<p>Video surveillance, at its most basic level, is the use of video cameras to
observe or survey. It is often called CCTV or “Closed Circuit Television”. At
its most abstract, video surveillance can be the modern-day equivalent to yesteryear's
guards, a replacement for human police, or an omnipresent workplace companion
who tells the boss everything you do – or don't do. Technically, modern video
surveillance involves remotely operated and monitored systems of linked cameras
able to tilt, pan, and zoom, and which can include the ability to record in
the dark, detect motion, or any of a number of increasingly sophisticated new
technologies such as automatic facial recognition. </p>
<p>Video surveillance can serve several purposes, the main being the protection
of people and property, the detection and prevention of crimes, and the associated
task of providing evidence towards the prosecution of a crime. In Australia
, the main purpose of video surveillance has been to provide enhanced perceptions
of safety in public places[<a href="#_edn3" id="_ednref3">3</a>], which has
been an arguable success. </p>
<p>Recent terrorism has seen a marked increase in security measures, including
the use of surveillance cameras and an increase in general public awareness
of the various methods used, and, with several countries launching concerted
campaigns to install cameras in public areas, video surveillance is becoming
increasingly popular as a form of crime deterrent. Public perception of the
technology, however, varies greatly from country to country, with the British
embracing public cameras as an effective form of crime prevention[<a href="#_edn4" id="_ednref4">4</a>],
while Canadians, as an example, are much more wary and less inclined to accept
the public use of surveillance cameras[<a href="#_edn5" id="_ednref5">5</a>]. </p>
<p>Fierce debate rages over the actual effectiveness of cameras in crime control,
with opponents claiming they are of no use at all – or can even increase the
potential for crime by providing a false sense of security, while proponents
claim camera installations have the potential to drastically reduce crime. [<a href="#_edn6" id="_ednref6">6</a>]
has echoed a view held by many other experts in the area, in a report to British
House of Lords, </p>
<blockquote>
<p><em>“…I firmly believe the overall justification for [surveillance cameras]
is specious, untested and is based largely on emotive grounds. Claims about
the impact of CCTV on levels and patterns of crime are frequently exaggerated
and simplistic. …[C]rimes of passion, crimes involving drugs and alcohol,
and actions by professional criminals are seldom prevented by the cameras.
…[O]nly minor “opportunistic” crime is diminished by the technology.” </em></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another issue raised by the use of cameras as a crime prevention tool arises
from the false sense of security they may engender. As [<a href="#_edn7" id="_ednref7">7</a>]
says, </p>
<blockquote>
<p><em>“...[I]t is important that the presence of video cameras not lead a person
to believe he or she will be rescued if attacked. Dummy cameras should not
be used [...]. While a fake camera can create a temporary deterrent to some
security incidents, the potential liability it creates due to a victim's impression
of being rescued quickly is not acceptable”. </em></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Despite these dim views, the use of video surveillance, and associated technologies
like facial recognition, continues to increase, as does the public awareness
of the technology – and with that, public antipathy. </p>
<h2>Privacy, Perversion & Public Perception </h2>
<p>Public tolerance of surveillance cameras, unsurprisingly, varies with their
location and the perceived threat they are countering. Security that would often
be considered intrusive under other circumstances is accepted at airports, for
example, </p>
<p>Face recognition technology, while still in infancy, is a controversial but
growing area of research with potentially disturbing implications. Face recognition
has obvious advantages in the field of national security and the prevention
of terrorism – something that has been receiving intense public scrutiny recently,
but it also provokes strong negative reactions from people who perceive its
potential for misuse as a more serious threat. It is also impossible for an
individual to determine whether a surveillance camera is connected to a face
recognition system or not, making potentially any camera a face recognition
system, prompting strong criticism of the technology[<a href="#_edn8" id="_ednref8">8</a>].
The prevalence of traditional video surveillance has also prompted many to question
just how long it will be until face recognition is used for tasks such as marketing,
and whether this should be allowed to happen. </p>
<p>Face recognition is still a new, largely untested and largely unknown, technology,
which has lead to many commentators to voice unrealistic and at times paranoid
views, with little or no basis in fact. One interesting example of some of the
wildly optimistic and unrealistic viewpoints held by the public about such new
technology can bee seen with Time magazine reporting that “The beauty of [face
recognition] is that it is disguiseproof. You can grow a beard and put on sunglasses,
and [face recognition] will still pick you out of a crowd[<a href="#_edn9" id="_ednref9">9</a>],”
whereas in actuality, even the best face recognition, even under ideal circumstances,
is prone to mistake. Another example of a common misconception of the technology
can be seen from a statement made by US Congressman Ed Markey talking about
a controversial trial use of face recognition at the Super Bowl XXXV in Florida,
“It's chilling, the notion that 100 000 people were subject to video surveillance
and had their identities checked by the government[<a href="#_edn9" id="_ednref9a">9</a>]”
Statements such as these tend to create a false sense of hysteria. People feel
that their privacy is being invaded and they are being treated as potential
criminals, whereas in actuality the system is doing little more than that which
the police have always done, and is not recording any information about people,
but merely comparing them against a list of known felons to attempt to find
a match. </p>
<p>This brings us to the fundamental question regarding the use of video surveillance,
and face recognition technology in particular – if its use in public spaces
is a violation of an individual's privacy. Legally, it is generally considered
that an individual cannot expect aspects of their physical characteristics that
are normally publicly available to be private[<a href="#_edn10" id="_ednref10">10</a>].
However, it is often not the straightforward aspects of such technology that
give rise to privacy concerns, but the more insidious follow-on effects that
could arise from networking, databasing and collaborating between various different
surveillance techniques or locations. Some obvious examples spring to mind –
the simple tracking of individuals in and out of airports and other transit
hubs, down to the shopping habits of individual consumers as they leave and
enter camera-ridden shopping centres. One simple, and often used, solution is
to provide a warning that an individual is under surveillance – the inference
being that the individual can then choose not to enter the area under surveillance
if they do not wish to be observed. This poses the obvious problem that when
major public areas such as train stations and shopping centres use video surveillance,
an individual does not usually have an alternative option if they aren't willing
to partake in the surveillance. </p>
<p>Another pertinent privacy issue arises with the storage of footage or other
information taken by video cameras. Several obvious issues arise, ranging from
the security of the stored information, through to its potential for future
use. In Australia, very broad guidelines on data storage and security are laid
down by [<a href="#_edn11" id="_ednref11">11</a>], but there are no industry-wide
guidelines or legally binding policies, allowing potentially many different
levels of security, and as with most security issues, the overall security is
only as strong as the weakest link. The lack of any enforceable guarantee of
security or standard method of deployment[<a href="#_edn12" id="_ednref12">12</a>]
hasn't helped bolster public confidence in video surveillance, and has allowed
protagonists of the systems to claim that there is, or will be, widespread abuse
of the installed systems[<a href="#_edn13" id="_ednref13">13</a>], although
so far there has been no conclusive evidence to support (or disprove) their
claims. </p>
<p>Given the lack of legal checks and limitations on the use of video surveillance,
many people are attempting to create a societal consensus suitable for incorporation
into a legal framework appropriate for governing the use of overt surveillance.
Most other forms of surveillance already have well founded legal precedents
or policies governing their use, which greatly enhance the individual's trust
in them, but overt video surveillance is still something of an ungoverned area,
allowing its almost unrestricted use, ethically or otherwise. Individual bodies
using the technology are generally responsible for creating their own guidelines,
should they wish, with public departments often creating comprehensive code's
of practice, such as that used by the City of Sydney for their Street Safety
Camera Program[<a href="#_edn14" id="_ednref14">14</a>], but many in the private
sector don't, leaving themselves and their surveillance systems almost totally
unaccountable. </p>
<h2>Conclusion </h2>
<p>It seems clear that overt video surveillance is set to continue, and increase,
in coming years – as will the controversy surrounding it, particularly as new
technologies such as facial recognition mature. It also seems safe to conclude
that, while there are definitely certain privacy losses from the widespread
use of overt public video surveillance, the technology in itself is not a considerable
privacy risk. The simple recording of an event at a single location by a public
camera provides very little in the way of private information. It is the collusion
between multiple sources of information that pose the more worrying privacy
risks – perhaps the ability to track an individual across an entire network
of cameras, or the use of data previously gathered from video surveillance to
allow future facial recognition of an individual, or even the potentially insecure
storage of footage. Issues such as these will become increasingly topical as
the use of these technologies becomes more widespread and the public become
more aware of the true capabilities of video surveillance and its associated
technologies. There is also currently a great deal of hype and misinformation
surrounding emerging surveillance technologies such as facial recognition, which
should decrease as the technologies become more widespread and accepted by the
public community, allowing a more reasoned approach to the entire debate. </p>
<p>To conclude, I quote The American Civil Liberties Union, who sum up the attitude
held by a lot of the public irrespective of any facts, “We are extremely troubled
by this unprecedented expansion in high-tech surveillance” [<a href="#_edn15" id="_ednref15">15</a>]. </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<div class="references">
<p>References: </p>
<p>[<a href="#_ednref1" id="_edn1">1</a>] J. Wakefield, BBC News, February 7, 2002,
“Watching your every move,” October 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_1789000/1789157.stm </p>
<p>[<a href="#_ednref2" id="_edn2">2</a>] Dr D. Wilson & Dr A. Sutton, “A report
to the Criminology Research Council,” <em>Department of Criminology University
of Melbourne, </em> April 2003 </p>
<p>[<a href="#_ednref3" id="_edn3">3</a>] “ NSW Government Policy Statement and
Guidelines for the Establishment and Implementation of CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION
(CCTV),” <em>NSW Government </em>, April 2003 </p>
<p>[<a href="#_ednref4" id="_edn4">4</a>] E. Short, J. Ditton, “Does closed circuit
television prevent crime?,” <em>CCTV Today </em>, 1995;2:10–12. </p>
<p>[<a href="#_ednref5" id="_edn5">5</a>] P. Danielson, “Video Surveillance for
the rest of us: Proliferation, Privacy, and Ethics Education,” <em>Centre for
Applied Ethics Univ. of British Columbia, </em><strong></strong>pp. 162, <strong></strong>2002 </p>
<p>[<a href="#_ednref6" id="_edn6">6</a>] S. Davies, Director General Privacy International,
“ SUMMARY OF ORAL EVIDENCE OF SIMON DAVIES BEFORE THE HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ENQUIRY INTO DIGITAL IMAGES AS EVIDENCE”, <em>Privacy
International, </em>October 23, 1997 </p>
<p>[<a href="#_ednref7" id="_edn7">7</a>] P. Danielson, “Video Surveillance for
the rest of us: Proliferation, Privacy, and Ethics Education,” <em>Centre for
Applied Ethics Univ. of British Columbia, </em> pp. 166, 2002 </p>
<p>[<a href="#_ednref8" id="_edn8">8</a>] P. E. Agre, “Your Face Is Not a Bar Code
– Arguments Against Automatic Face Recognition in Public Places,” October 2004,
http://dlis.gseis.ucla.edu/people/pagre/bar-code.html </p>
<p>[<a href="#_ednref9" id="_edn9">9</a>] L. Grossman, “Welcome to the snooper
bowl,” <em>Time </em>, Feb 12, 2001. </p>
<p>[<a href="#_ednref10" id="_edn10">10</a>] J.D. Woodard, “Super Bowl surveillance:
Facing up to biometrics,” October 2004, http:///www.rand.org/publications/
IP/IP209/ </p>
<p>[<a href="#_ednref11" id="_edn11">11</a>] “ National Privacy Principles,” Office
of Legislative Drafting, Attorney-General's Department, Canberra , pp5, Jan
2001 </p>
<p>[<a href="#_ednref12" id="_edn12">12</a>] “ Surveillance: an interim report
3. Overt surveillance: issues ,” <em>Law Reform Commission NSW </em>, <em></em>2001 </p>
<p>[<a href="#_ednref13" id="_edn13">13</a>] ACLU, “What's Wrong With Public Video
Surveillance?,” October 2004, http://archive.aclu.org/issues/privacy/CCTV_Feature.html </p>
<p>[<a href="#_ednref14" id="_edn14">14</a>] “City of Sydney 's Street Safety Camera
Program Code of Practice,” <em>Council of Sydney & Privacy NSW, </em> 2000 </p>
<p>[<a href="#_ednref15" id="_edn15">15</a>] “Proliferation of surveillance devices
threatens privacy,” archive.aclu.org/ news/2001/n071101a.html. </p>
</div>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p>02-DEC-2004</p>
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